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A SEMI-CLASSICAL MODEL
OF PRICE LEVEL ADJUSTMENT
ABSTRACF
This paper investigates the theoretical and empirical properties of &modelof aggregate
supply behavior that was introduced in the 1970s but has received inadequate attention. The
model postulates that price changes occur so as to gradually eliminate discrepancies between
actual and market-clearing values and to reflect expected changes in market-clearing values. Its
implications are more "classical' than most alternative formulations that reflect gradual price
adjustment Empirical results, which utilize a proxy for market-clearing output that is a function
of fixed capital and the real price of oil, are modemtely encouraging but not entirely supportive.
Bennett t McCallum




The purpose of this paper is to investigate the theoretical and
empirical properties of one particular model of aggregate supply behavior
that has not, in my opinion, attracted the attention that it deserves. The
model in question features price level stickiness——i.e., gradual adjustment
ittresponse toshocks——butneverthelesshas several "classical"
characteristics. Its specification was first proposed by Grossman (1974) but
was more prominently introduced by Barro and Grossman (1976). Shortly
thereafter it was independently conceived and more formally justified by
Mussa (1977, 1981a, 1981b, 1982), and was used as the centerpiece of a number
of papers by myself.t This model——which I will call the P—bar model—-has
never been the subject of extensive empirical study, however, and has almost
disappeared from the literature in recent years.
In the following sections it will be suggested that recent neglect of
the P—bar model Is unwarranted. In particular, I will argue that its
theoretical properties are more satisfactory than those of some leading
operational models of aggregate supply——here attention will be focused
especially on the formulations of Taylor (1979, 1980, 1993) and Fuhrer and
Moore (1993a. 1993b)——and that its empirical performance is reasonably
satisfactory. There is a problem relating to the implied time series
properties of capacity output, but essentially the same flaw pertains to the
other models under discussion, as well.Throughout, the perspective of the
analysis will be that of a macroeconomic researcher whose concern is the
development of a compact quarterly econometric model that has reasonable
theoretical properties and is empirically consistent with the postwar U.S.
data,
The outline of the paper is a follows.The P—bar model is introduced
and briefly discussed in Section II.Then its basic theoretical properties
Iare considered in Section III, after which some discussion of alternative
models is presented, with Section IV being devoted primarily to the model of
Fuhrer and Moore. Empirical analysis with quarterly U. S. data for 1954—1990
is developed in Section V.A few- theoretical issues are then discussed in
Section VI and a brief conclusion follows.
II. Basic Description of the P—Bar Model
TheF—bar model of aggregate supply shares the assumption of most
econometric models that prices adjust to shocks incompletely,within each
period, with output being determined by the quantity demanded at the
resulting price level. This particular model's distinguishing characteristic
is that the determination of each period's price level depends upon movements
of the hypothetical price level that would, given prevailing conditions, make
output equal to its capacity value. Let Pt and y denote logarithms of the
price level and output,respectively,in the aggregate or for a
representative producer.Also, let denote the 'capacity" or "natural
rate" level of y, the value that the latter would assume if prices were
perfectly flexible. Then is defined as the "market clearing" value of Pt
that would induce Yt to equal ,givencurrent conditLons. In terms of
these variables, the P—bar price adjustment equation can be written as
(1) Pt —Pt-i=7(Pt-i—Pt-i)+Eti(—
withi>> 0.Here Et(') representsthe expectation of the indicated
variableconditional upon information available at time t,with this
informationhenceforth assumed to include all relevant variables realized in
torin previousperiods. Thus price adjustments are specified to occur in
proportionto the previous period's discrepancy between Pt and its
market—clearingvalue, provided that no changes in the market clearing value
itself are expected, But if they are, then the expected change in is also
a component of the realized change in Pt'
2An alternativeformulation, employed in my papers and by Obstfeld and
Rogoff(1984). reflects the fact that Pt —t willby Construction berelated
to Yt —t. Indeed,if the modelislinear, these variables will be
proportional——with a negative coefficient, of course——and equation (1) can
equivalently bewrittenas
(2) Pt —Pt-i ri(yt—i —c_1) +E_1(pt —
withy,>O.The constant of proportionality relating Tiand; will depend,
obviously, on the properties of the model's aggregate demand relations.
Which of these two formulations, (1) or (2), should be considered more
nearly structural?The answer to that question depends upon the analysis
used to justify the implied type of price setting behavior. Mussa (198ib)
bases his argument on profit maximization calculations made in the face of
lump—sum price adjustment costs with averaging across individual firms, an
approach which gives rise to (1).2 My own preferred rationale presumes that
prices must be set at the start of the period in which they will apply and
that production will equal whatever quantity is demanded.3One basic
assumption is that it is costly, in terms of real resources, for producers to
make between—period changes in output relative to capacity.4 But it is also
costly, of course, for output to differ from its capacity level.Thus if
these two cost components are quadratic, the producer will set a price that
is expected to yield a magnitude of demand (and output) that is dependent
both on andn-i -c-1. theextent of dependence on the latter being
higher for higher adjustment costs. From the perspective of this approach.
formulation (2) is the more basic and more nearly structural.5
In terms of its superficial appearance, the adjustment specification (2)
looks much like a typical expectational Phillips relation of the i9lOs.
There are two significant differences, however, that should be noted. First,
the "expected inflation" term pertains to changes in the market—clearing
3price Pt.notto changes in Pt itself. Second, the output gap term pertains
tothe previous period'sdiscrepancy between Yt and ,notthevalue for the
current period.As a consequence, the mode of behavior represented by (2)
makesPt an entirely predetermined variable.That raises some issues that
will be addressed momentarily, but first it should be noted that the
interaction of these two unusual features is itself quite significant.
Specifically, a version of (2) in which the third term is the expectation of
Apt, rather than Ap, makes no sense if expectations are rational.To see
that, replace E_1A in (2) with and apply the conditional
expectation operator to the equation. The resulting expression is
(3) 0 =y,(y,-i—
whichimplies that y, =S forall t, i.e., that output is always equal to
its capacity value.But that means that the specification with E_,Ap
cannot be used, given the assumption of rational expectations, to yield a
model in which output fluctuates relative to capacity.6
What about the property of Pt being entirely predetermined? In
practice, one would presumably want to add a stochastic disturbance term to
(2). to reflect the effects of the many small influences that are omitted in
anytractable model.Butthat would not alter the important properties of
thespecification to any appreciable extent. A more significant modification
would,however, be possible. Specifically, one could regard the magnitude of
Pt determined by (2) as a planned value, which might be altered within period
t in response to the occurrence of conditions significantly different than
those previously expected. Indeed, one might interpret the non—dynamic
TMprice stickiness" models of Hankiw (1985) or Ball and Romer (1990) as
pertainingto this latter form of adjustment. Recognizing such adjustments
would, interestingly, make the model one with a reduced degree of price
stickiness relative to the P—bar formulation (2). Since a major theme ofour
4discussion will be the rather "classical' nature of the P—bar model——i.e.,
its similarity in several respects to models with perfectly flexible
prices——it will strengthen the argument7 to exclude within—period adjustments
of the Hankiw—Ball—Romer type. Accordingly, all of the discussion below will
be based on equation (2) rather than an extended model that includes such
adjustments.
A closely related issue involves the role of inventories, briefly
mentioned in In. 4.A producer that holds a stock of finished goods has
available a third way of responding to shocks, in addition to output and
price adjustments. Incorporating inventory holdings into our model would
therefore serve to make it more flexible. But since we are emphasizing the
classical properties of systems including (a), our argument will again be
strengthened by abstracting from these extra features.8
From its definition, it is clear that one can obtain an explicit
expression for the market clearing price only after adoption of a
specification regarding aggregate demand.In my previous work, the demand
specification typically used was9
(4) yt =Pa+fli(mt—Pt)+ P2Et_dpt., —Pt)+ 3y1 t Vt.
where mt is the log of the money stock and Vt is a stochastic disturbance
term, which we shall here take to be a random walk (so that =Vt—vt..1is
white noise). This expression can be obtained by writing IS and LII functions
of the form
(5) yt bo +burt—E_i(p,1—p)1+b2y—1+Vit
and
(6) mt —Ptc0 +ciyt+ cart +Vat,
and solving out the endogenous variable rt)° There are two problems with
this specification, however, even if one accepts the general spirit of an
IS—UI type of model. One concerns the expectation operator in (5); it would
5seem more appropriate 1specified as And the second pertains to the
real interest rate appearing in the IS function; many analysts would think
that a long—term real rate such as —Et(pt+N—Pt).withNan integer
greaterthan 1. should appear rather than the one—period real rate.iiThus
(4)can beused only as a source of examples, not general conclusions
regardingor the properties of a model thatincorporates the P—bar
relation(2).
III. Properties ofthe P—Bar Model
Thejust—mentioned problems are quite important with respect to
argumentsconcerning the famous or infamous "policy ineffectiveness
proposition"that played a prominent role in my 1979 and 1980 papers.It is
not difficult to show 12 that if (4) represents aggregate demand, then the
time series process for Yt —t willbe given as
(7) —= $l(mt — E_,m)+I1-'z($+fi2)](y-1—
+ (v—E_1v)—(yt—
sothat it is only the surprise component of monetary policy that affects Yt
— forany policy feedback rule that bases the systematic part of mt
entirely on variables from period t—1 and before.Thus the policy
ineffectiveness proposition will hold in this case. But it will not hold if
the demand schedule includes Ep.1 or any other variable Zt for which the
behavior of Zt —E_,zis affected by the policy rule.13 So this proposition
should not be regarded as a general implication of the P—bar model.
Forillustrative purposes,however——and possibly as a useful
approximation——let us provisionally adopt (4) as an AD specification.14 Then
wecanwrite
(8) Pt = [fib+ fi1m + fi2E..1p1 + fi3yt-i + vt —yI,
which implies that
(9) Pt = [fig+ fim + $￿E_1p+1 + 83Yt-i+vt —çj.
6From these two expressions we see that
(10) Pt —
P1P2
t$i('n,. —E_1m)+ v —E_1v—(yt—
andthat
— (—1) —
(11) Pt—i —Pt—i— En—i—n—d. P1 P2
Substitution of these into the P—bar equation (2), followed by Borne
rearrangement, yields
(12) Yt
—y=Th(mt—E_1m)+I1—v($+ $)J (n—i— yt—,)+ Ct —Ut
where andUtZ t — are the (exogenous) unexpectedcomponentsof Vt
and .
In(12). we see that Yt —tis explained by its own lagged value and
three surprise terms.Consequently, with (4) taken to represent AD, the
policy ineffectiveness property holds, as stated previously, and the model
implies that Yt —j isgenerated by a first—order autoregressive process
(denoted AR (1)1 with coefficient 1 —(fi +Ba).15 The compatibility of
that implication with the U.S. quarterly data will be considered below in
Section V.
Continuing with the analysis of the model (2) (4), we wish next to
obtain a solution expression for Ape, the inflation rate. A crucial step is
to evaluate E,(p —t-).which we do by differencing (9) and applying
E_1(
.
(13) E_1L = ($jEt..iAmt+ P2(Et..ipt.. —E_3pt)+ RaAyt_, Bi"Pa
—
Thuswe see that to determine the time series properties of Apt, it will be
necessary to adopt some assumption about the processes generating Am and Yt.
Anticipating evidence discussed in Section V, let us take Lint to obey an
AR(1) process and açaMACi) process:16
(14) =Mo+ M'TMt-t + Ct
(is) = Ut+ eut_i 6>0.
7And forthe sake of discussion, let us suppose that it is permissible to




sothat inflation is given by
(17) APt =l(yl— + IPiCpo +Am_i) + 3Ay1 —Out_i).
The latter expression would be operational——i.e., subject to estimation——if
were observable. Possible proxies will be considered in Section V.
Also of considerable interest is the corresponding univariate expression
that we can obtain when =0by writing (12) as
(18) y —yt=#(yt_i—yt_i)+
where *=Riet+ —u,implying yt —S't=(1—QL)1*t.Then defining
Mi'=M,/($i+) and 0' so/($+ Ba). we have
(19) APt 11(1— øL)1t_i+ Mi'(1—iziL)e_i+
where the constant term is suppressed. or
(20) (1—L)(1—gzjL)Apvi(1—gs1L)_1 +
+9'(1—as1L)(1—#L)u_3.
Granger's Lemma shows the right hand side of (20) to be a HA(2) process, so
we have found the Inflation rate to be an AB}tA(2.2) process from the
univariate perspective.Clearly, therefore, there are many parameter values
for 0 and gi, that will imply a great deal of inflation persistence.
Next it will be appropriate to demonstrate explicitly that——as mentioned
above——the policy ineffectiveness proposition does not apply when Ep
appears in the AD function, For this demonstration let us write the system
as
(Zia) Pt —Pt-i=ziCyt-,
—_i)+ E_ ( —p-1)
(21b) y,—Pi(mt—Pt)+p2E(p+, —Pt)+
(21c) (Bim +BzEtpt+, + vt
—
(21d) mt=Mimt_,+







(23) Pt-i — Pt-i (Yt-i
—
Pi+P2
Consequently,substitution into (21a) plus rearrangement yields
(24) —Yt fi,(mt —E_imt)+ 2 —
+(1—7i(P1+P2)](yt_i9t_i)+Ctut.
instead of (12). But the minimal state variable solution to the model
implies that PtIsof the form
(25) Pt =l'io+ Oiimt_i+Ol2Ct + Qi3Vt_ + #i4t + QisYt-i+OisYt-i+
Qirut.
and thus that
(26) Ep,1 —E_,p+1((#,+ 4'isi)et +(0*3+Ois)Ct +
(Ois—
wherewe have used (24) to eliminate Yt — Then tedious algebra
reveals that the composite parameters of the latter involve the policy
parameter
17Thus the unconditional variance of Yt —t willdepend upon
which implies failure of the ineffectiveness proposition.
By contrast,the natural rate hypothesis-—as defined by Lucas
(1972)——does hold in the P-bar model. The unconditional meanofthe output
gap E(y —yt)cannot, thatis, be affected by any aspect of the monetary
policy rule. Proof of this proposition is readily obtained by application of
the unconditional expectation operator E(') to (24), which yields
(27) E(y —yt) (1 — + Pz))E(y_1 —n-i).
Butthe latter implies that E(y —y)is a stable process that converges
toward zero. And the steps in the derivation of (27) have made no reference
to the process generatin mt, so the foregoing conclusion is quite general.
18
9This property, of conformance to the natural rate hypothesis. is (I
would contend) extremely attractive. For it seems implausible, as Lucas
said, that output could be kept Dermanently high (relative to its natural
rate or capacity value) by any pattern of behavior of the monetary
authorities. And yet it is the case that almost all empirical models of
aggregate supply——i.e., wage—price specifications in econometric models——fail
to satisfy the natural rate hypothesis. That this is true for specifications
involving the concept of a NAIRU (non—accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment) can be seen immediately: -the existence of a stable relationship
between unemployment and the acceleration magnitude19 implies that the
unemploymentrate canbe permanently lowered by permanently generating a
higheraccelerationmagnitude.In addition, a similar result pertains to a
specificationof the form
(28) Pt —Pt-i6( —pt-i) i>o>o,
which is basically the same as the price—adjustment equation of the MI'S
20
model. To see this, write (28) as
(29) Pt —Pt-i=6Pt—Pt)+6(p—Pt-i)
and note that with a sustained inflation, such that hp =Ap-1.a high value
of Apt will keep Pt —Ptand——therefore Yt —y——highpermanently.
Of more interest, perhaps, is the situation with regard to the
wage—price specification, involving overlapping nominal contracts, of John
Taylor ((1979, 1980, i993).This specification is well—known not only from
Taylor's own work, but also from its use in econometric models developed and
utilized by other researchers (including Gagnon and Tryon (1993) and Hasson,
Symansky, and Meredith (1990) in the MX3 and Multimod models).In fact, I
think it is fair to say that it is currently the leading model of aggregate
supply among researchers using estimated econometric models.
A two—period version of Taylor's setup can be used to develop the points
10at issue. Let Pt be the aggregate price (or wage) index——in log terms——which
is an average of the (log) contract prices negotiated in the current and most
recent periods, x, and xt,:
(30) Pt0.5 (xt +
Contract prices are set by half of the sellers in period t to keep in step
with prices pertaining to the other half of the sellers, with an adjustment
added to reflect the effects of excess demand (current and expected):
(31) x, =0.5(Pt + Ep+1) + 0.S6E( +
where —Yt•Together, (30) and (31) imply that
(32) x 0.5 (xti + Ex+1) + 6E(+
and thus that
(33) 00.5 (Eax+1 —Axe)+ 8E(+
But from the latter we can see that a policy that keeps àx greater than
ax,. will keep Yt —Ytbelow zero, on average, if expectations are rational.
Thus the Taylor model does not have the natural rate property. It predicts.
however, that an accelerating inflation will keep output low——not high, as
with the NAIRIJ model.
Quite recently, Fuhrer and Moore (1993a, i993b) have developed an
aggregate supply specification that can be viewed as a revised version of the
Taylor model. Their work suggests that this specification has both
theoretical and empirical properties that make it preferable to its
predecessor.The Fuhrer—Hoore analysis of aggregate supply is developed.
however, in the context of a small econometric model whose framework differs
fromthe one presented above, and whichdoes so in an interesting way. Their
papersalso present the empirical properties of their model in an unorthodox
yet interesting fashion.Accordingly, it will be desirable to devote an
entire section to the discussion of the Fuhrer—Moore analysis. This
constitutes something of a digression, but is useful in preparing the scene
iifor our empirical analysis of the P—bar model by emphasizing the importance
of inflation—rate persistence and the use of autocorrelation functions to
summarize a model's empirical performance. Readers who dislike digressions
could, nevertheless, skip directly to Section V.
IV. The Fubrerand MooreModel
Aslightlysimplified version of the Fuhrer—Moore (F8e4) macroeconomet.ric
model can be written as follows:
(34) Pt— d(Etpt+i—Pt) = rt —
(35) = bo + b1 Pt-i +b2Yt-t +Ct
(36a) Pt=O.5(x +
(36b)t=O.5(x — Pt)+0.5(x_i —pt-i)
(36c) —Pt=0.5(i' + Ev+1)+ O.5&E(y+y.i)
(37) r =rt.i +pz,Ap_,+ + et.
Here (34) is a term structure equationthatrelates the long—termreal
interest rate Pttothe one—period real rate, d>0 being a "duration"
parameter (such as 40 for a ia—year real rate in a quarterly model).
Equation (35)isF&M's IS specification, with a second lagged y, term here
deleted for clarity.Equation (37) is the model's monetary policy rule, in
which it is presumed that the short—term interest rate is used as the policy
instrument.
And, finally, equations (36) describe the aggregate supply sector that
constitutes a variation on Taylor.22 The authors' apparent rationale is that
Taylor's formula (31) describing contract price determination is replaced
with one in which the nominal price of each sector's output is set so as to
equate its relative price, Xt— Pt'to the average of the other sector's
expected relative prices over the life of the contract, with an adjustment
(as in Taylor) for current and expected values of .InTaylor's setup, by
contrast, it is nominal sectoral prices thatarerelated in this fashion,
12There is some hint in their exposition that this modification would make
better sense theoretically, but the principal advantage claimed by F&M is
that it makes the inflation rate, rather than the price level, sticky. One
way to see thatisto note that in my simplified version
(38) —Pt=
from(36a), so that v,= 0.25(xt + àx..i). Putting these in (36c) gives
(39) =0.5&t_l+ 0.5E8x+i +26E(+
whichshows that contract price inflation is an average of its own past and
expected future values, plus a cyclical adjustment term that will be small
empirically, and is therefore sticky. In Taylor's setup, by contrast, we
have a similar expression but with contract prices (xt) in place of inflation
rates (Ax). Furthermore, with sticky inflation, the F&H model can be shown
to match some important features of the U.S. data with much greater accuracy,
as we shall see shortly.
Ky first impression was that the F&H specification also had the
advantageof conforming to the natural rate hypothesis. And it is true that
cannot be kept permanently away from zero by a constant acceleration, as
in the Taylor casediscussed above. This can be seenby Inspection of (39).
But that relation can be rearranged as follows, with E(•) operators deleted:
(40) 00.5 (b4x+1 —Mx)+2&(+ t.i).
From the latter it is clear that an ever—increasing acceleration of
inflation, with Mx growing over time, will keep the average value of
permanently low. So my first impression was incorrect; the F&I4 specification
actually does not satisfy the strict, Lucas (1972) version of the natural
rate hypothesis——and this remains true in the slightly more complicated
version that is actually used in their papers.
Nevertheless, I find the F&il specification quite interesting and worthy
of additional consideration.The same might be said, moreover, for their
13empirical analysis and other aspects of their model.Let us continue,
accordingly, with our discussion of system (34) —(37).
It is striking that this model has no monetary sector, i.e., no money
demand function and no mention of a money stock variable.Given that
feature, the way that monetary policy works is as follows. The monetary
authority's actions in (37) are changes in short—term interestrates.24 These
affect the long—term real rate via (34) and its value feeds into the
determination of real aggregate demand in (35). Then demand—induced
movements in output affect price determination in the block (36a) —(36c).
That description is overly simplified, because it exaggerates the model's
recursiveness, but is not seriously misleading. A crucial point is that the
system hangs together and permits monetary policy actions to affect and Pt
only if the parameter 6 in (36c) is non—zero.If S equaled zero, then the
three equations (36) would form a self—contained system in the variables Pt,
xt, and Vt.In other words, prices would be exogenous.In light of that
property of the model, it is rather disturbing that the estimated value of 6
in P8.11 (1993b) Is only 0.007 with a standard error of 0.004.
Be that as it may, let us consider the fact that no money demand
equation is included. Of course one——similar to our (4), for example——could
be added to the model, in which case it would determine the quantity of money
that the monetary authority has to (elastically) supply to conduct its
interest—rate—centered policy.But the properties of that money demand
function would have no consequences for the behavior of any of the basic
variables Pt.rt, Pt,x,,or v,.P8.14seem to view this property of their
setup as a virtue, since it is widely believed that money demand behavior has
featured considerable "instability" in recent years. But is this feature
theoretically plausible? Strictly speaking, It is not nIL oneaccepts
the IS—UI framework for aggregate demand analysis, for properly specified IS
14functions include wealth terms and real money balances are a component of
wealth.
25Thus a term involvingm—PtOtmti - Pt properly belongs in
equation (35), which alters this special property of the P814model.Their
response, presumably, would be thatrealbalance terms are of minor
importance quantitatively.But I am not certain thatthis argument is
correct,in the context of their model. For even if the coefficient on m —
Pt in (34)issmall in comparison with the coefficienton Pt-s. it maybethe
casethat Pt reacts weakly to policy changes in rt.26 And if variations in rt
have appreciable effects on at, via the money demand function, then the
impact on aggregate demand via the real balance variable could be of the same
order of magnitude as the impact by way of the long term real rate of
interest.
Themost impressive part of the P814 analysis is the extent to which the
pattern of autocorrelations (own and across variables) implied by their
estimated model matches those of the U.S. data (or, to be more precise, those
of an unconstrained vector autoregression system). These autocorrelation
functions are plotted for the three main variables (tp. rt, and in
Figures i and 2.There it can be seen that the general qualitative
description of the model's implied autocorrelation functions matches those of
the unconstrained VAR with impressive accuracy.27 For the sake of comparison,
analogous functions implied by the same framework, except with Taylor—style
nominal contracts in place of (36), is shown in Figure 3,28
There are a few aspects of the Fail empirical analysis, nevertheless,
thatare somewhat troubling. One,already mentioned, is the magnitude of the
crucial5 parameter in (36c).Another concerns their choice of variables to
be treated as stationary in their VARsystem.The results described above
arebased on a system in which APt, r, and Sare viewedasstationary,
althoughtheir Dickey—Fuller and Johansen tests for unit roots are somewhat
15Figure 1
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18inconsistent with that specification. I am sympathetic to Cochrane's
(1991) argument——that a priori reasoning and general knowledge are more
useful than formal tests (or unit roots——however, and would accordingly
support the FIJIstationarityassumption. But I am bothered by their
specification of the "normal output" measure——analogous to ——used in
constructing .Inparticular, their implied 5iissimply a deterministic
trend fitted to the Yt data for 1959—1990, i.e., is the deviation from
this trend. But any reasonable concept of "normal," or "capacity," or
"natural rate" values of Yt would have to recognize that their evolution over
time is a consequence of capital accumulation, population growth, and
technological progress. All of these processes are ones, however, for which
a sizable "permanent" component would be expected, a priori, which would
suggest a process for y that contains a unit root component.This issue
will receive additional attention in the next section. where we turn to the
empirical properties of the P—bar model.29
V. EmDirical Analysis
We now turn to an attempt to evaluate the empirical support, or lack of
support, for the P—bar model.An outstanding source of difficulty in this
regard is the fact that two crucial variables, and .areunobservable.
Of course they are related to each other by equation (9), or its counterpart,
so that in principal there is only one variable missing.But that is of
little consolation to the researcher,especially since the proper
specification of (9) is debatable and its estimation difficult,Another
important difficulty is that accurate implementation requires accurate
specification of aggregate demand behavior.
The absence of observations on y, or an alternative capacity variable.
is also a serious problem for the models of Taylor, FIJI, and most others in
which price adjustments are sluggish.The problem can typically be glossed
19over in presentations, because y does not figure as prominently in the
discussion as Pt and Yt do in ours.But these other models could be quite
different empirically if the implicit definition of y were changed——from a
deterministic trend to some unit root specification, for example.
An implication of the F—bar model, or at least the version emphasized in
Section II, is that =y—yis a stationary first—order AR process. Let
us now consider whether it is possible to reconcile that implication with the
presumption——stated above——that y is generated by a unit root process and
also the observed time—series properties of Yt' With the latter represented
by (the log of) U.S. quarterly data on real GNP, seasonally adjusted, we know
that the process is close to
(41) (1—0.3L)Ay =const+
or the nearly—identical trend—stationary model
(42) (1—0.35L + 0.30L2)y =trend+
where w denotes a white—noise variate. Actual estimates for 1954.1 —1990.4
and 1965.1 —1990.4are given in Table 1.
Now suppose that the process for t is a =(1+ O.65L)u and that yt
0.95 + .Thenfor y we would have
(43) =y+ (1 —0.95LY'ut=
C1+O65L) +
0.95L'
Multiplying by (1 —L)(l—0.3L)we obtain




Butif we drop all terms in L of higher than first order, the right hand side
of the latter becomes
(45) (1 + 0.35L)u + (1 —0.35L)*.
Thus if Ut and were uncorrelated and had the same variance, (44) would be
of the same form as (41).This will not be exactly the case, of course——it
cannot be since u. is a component of Øtbut it would seem plausible that the
specification under discussion would provide a reasonably satisfactory
20Table 1
AMA Modelsfor Real GNP
SamplePeriod
AR(l) for6yt 1954.1—1990.4 1965.1 —1990.4
Constant 0.0049 0.0050
(.001) (.001)
AR coefficient 0.3281 0.2837
(.078) (.095)
a2 0.1084 0.0796
SE 0. 0095 0.0095
DW 2.07 2.05
AR(2) forYt
Constant 0. 3167 0. 8840
(.1471 (.263)
Time coeff. 0.00032 0.00078
(.00016) (.00024)
1st AR coeff. 1.3064 1. 1998
(.078) (.094)
2ndAR coeff. —0.3505 —0.3220
(.078) (.092)
ii2 0.9992 0.9979
SE 0. 0094 0. 0091
DW 2.10 2.14
21rationalization of the conditions mentioned at the start of this paragraph.
In an attempt to construct an empirical counterpart of the capacity
variable. y,,I have obtainedaquarterly time series for net private
nonresidential fixed capital.An annual series on that variable has been
published by Musgrave (i992); our quarterly version was constructed by
allocating each year's growth in capital to its four quarters in proportion
to that quarter's share of the year's gross private nonresidential investment
(1987 prices).Values are reported in Appendix A.Let the log of that
variable be denoted 1c. Then one possible measure of would be the fitted
value given by the following regression relating Yt to lct:30
(46) Yt =1.539+0.800k1 SE =0.037i
(.060) (.0076)
(Here, as in all that follows, the sample period is 1954. —1990.4.)The
time series properties of the implied measure are not, however, consistent
with the specification used in the previous paragraphs; instead, an AE(2) in
Ay is indicated.
A second attempt included POt, the real price of imported as a
second explanatory variable.32 The estimated relation is
(47) yt1.012+O.860k_1—O.OSSpot_i SE 0.0282
(.068) (.0081) (.0054)




it2 =0.242 SE a0.0049 Dl.!1.87
Thus it transpires that a t4A(i) process with MA coefficient of 0.607 fits the
data quite well. And this provides a good match to the specification assumed
in the construction of equations (43) —(45),The implied Yt measure,
labelled YGAPKO, is plotted in Figure 4 (together with the measure YGAPS4
22implied by a linear deterministic trend for y,j.
DoestheYGAPKO measure of y —Yt—Ythave reasonable properties for
use with our P—bar model? One positive characteristic is that the
Dickey—Fuller test statistic (constant, no trend, 2 lags) is 3.39, easily
adequate to reject a unit—root null hypothesis at the 0.05 significance
level.(The MacKinnon critical value is —2.88.) A 0.05 rejection can barely
be obtained for the measure implied by (45), whose t—value is —2.92, and the
measure implied by a fitted deterministic trend for y does not permit
rejection (t value =—2.38)at all. On the other hand, the implied AMA
process for ?GAPKO is not anAR(i). Instead, the following is implied:
(49) yt0.00012+l.245y_1—O.350
(.0008) (.078) (.078)
=0.870 SE =0.010 DW2.01
Thus the YGAPICO specification is not fully consistent with the P—bar model.
Whether that is because the capacity measure is unsatisfactory or because the
model is flawed cannot be determined from this one mismatch. In any event,
the mismatch is not extremely severe. In what follows, accordingly, the
YGAPKO measure of twillbe utilized, for a lack of anything better,
wherever such a measure is required.
Next we turn our attention to the aggregate demand portion of the model.
Estimates for a few alternative specifications in first—differenced form are
presented in Table 2.In all of these, the (St. Louis. adjusted) monetary
base is used as the money stock variable.Both 01$ and TSLS estimates are
presented, the instruments for the latter including two lagged values of
6in, and Ap For some reason, the parameter estimates for both Pi and P2
are larger when the TSLS procedure is used, and most t statistics are
increased even though overall explanatory power is (as it must be) lower.
The various estimates of Pareall close to 0.3 and those of Pi are all in
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19551960196519701975198019851990Table 2
Estimates of Aggregate Demand Relation (4)
DependentVariableis Lye, Sample Period 1954.1 —1990.4
Estimates (std. errors)
attached to OLS TSL? OLS TSLS
Constant 0.0042 0.0036 0.0043 0.0038
(.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0011)
tiui —APt 0.294 0.552 0.276 0.505
(.097) (.168) (.106) (.205)
—Pt) 0.077 0.812
(.179) (1.59)
tYt-i 0.301 0.272 0.302 0.279
(.076) (.079) (.077) (.086)
Statistics
0.161 0.121 0.163 —0.035
SE 0.0092 0.0094 0.0092 0.0103
DW 2.10 2.01 2.11 2.17
°Instrumentsbased on constant, Ay,.2, Am_3, £Pti. Ap1_2.
2533
all, however, by the results inTable2.
An alternative method of estimating $ is to recognize that equations
(4)—(6) imply that fl —aic2/(a1ci +c2)and ft —a1/(a1c1+c2).Therefore
—ca, where c2 is the semi—elasticity of money demand with respect to
the short—term rate of interest. Let us then estimate a money—demand
function,taking careto express rt in units comparable to Alogp——i. e., as
annualizedpercentage points divided by 400. The result is as follows:
(50) —Ap0.00052+0.1i9Ay
—0.564r1+0.547(Am_1—
(.0007) (.0591) (.269) (.071)
0.351 SE =0.0064 N =2.25
Thusthe suggested value for $2/elisabout 0.564.If mt is measured by Mi
ratherthan the monetary base, however,the estimated value of 83/P1 jumpsto
1.007.So, this approach suggests that p is ofthesame order of magnitude
as 81——say,about 0.3 —0.4——butprobably somewhat smaller.
It would be entirely reasonable to wonder about the neglect of fiscal
policy variables in the aggregate demand relation (4).Indeed, the rate of
government purchases would be expected to enter in the IS relation (5) and
therefore in (4) even if the economy were one in which Ricardian equivalence
prevailed. Accordingly, estimates were obtained for versions of the
relations appearing in columns one and three of Table 2 but with Ag and
tg_1 also included, g being the log of state, local, and federal government
purchases.In column one, the estimated parameter values (standard errors)
are 0.094 (.054) and —0,097(.055) and for column three the corresponding
figures are almost exactly the same.In both cases, the hypothesis that the
tg terms jointly provide no explanatory power cannot be rejected at the 0.05
significance level. Consequently, it seems unlikely tht our omission of the
government spending variables, which was adopted in Section II to keep the
model clean and simple, is a significant flaw.
26Another behavioral relation that is needed to assemble a quantitative
version of the P—bar model is a policy rule for the generation of £m. For
our sample period, the following AR(3) model matches the data rather well:
(51) 6.m0.00214 +Q.562n,iO.0009àm.2+0.29Thm3
(.008) (.079) (.092) (.079)
0.633 SE = 0.0047 DW2.00
Moreover,lagged values of ap and provide no explanatory power and do not
upset the estimates in -(51). From this equation, accordingly, we can
calculate the expected value E_,&n.
It is now finally time to turn to the price adjustment equation that is
our principle object of concern. For empirical purposes we shall focus on a




In estimating (52), we use predicted values from (51) and (48) to represent
the indicated expectations. Results are as follows:
(53) tp 0.0080 +0.0505..+0.SS6E_1àm—O.148y_1—0.500Et_4
(.0016) (.016) (.074) (.046) (.162)
=0.368 SE0.0053 DW0.87
In terms of support provided for the P—bar model, these figures must be
regarded as mixed. Unsatisfactory elements are the residual autocorrelation
indicated by OW and the wrong—signed coefficient on Quite favorable.
however, are the magnitudes of the coefficients attached to the key
variables. andE_1Am. With regard to the former, the implication is
that departures of y from yt lead to price level adjustments that come about
slowly but surely; the parameter estimate is over three times the size of its
standarderror. Andregarding Et_i&i. the estimated parameter value agrees
nicelywiththe magnitude implied by our estimated value of P2/Ph: with the
latter ranging from 0.56 to 1.0, the implied value for Pi/(fii +P2)ranges
from 0.64 to 0.50.
27Simply for the sake of comparison, consider also a version of (53)
estimated with yt-i defined relative to a deterministic trend.In this case,
the coefficient on that variable rises to 0.066 (.012) and the one attached
to E..1Ain falls to 0.456 (.074). In addition, when an equation explaining
hp with four lagged values of itself and our preferred measure of y..1 is
estimated, the coefficient on the latter remains significantly positive and
residual autocorrelation is eliminated.M
In principle, it would be interesting to use the estimated model to
explore the system's autocorrelation structure in the manner of Fuhrer and
Moore.A direct comparison with the F&H results would not be appropriate,
however, because of three differences between their estimated system and
ours.These are: (1) Different monetary policy instruments are used. (ii)
The F&tl policy rule, unlike ours, features policy responses designed to
stabilize output and inflation——to keep and Isp1 reasonably close to target
values.(iii) The F&M aggregate demand sector, unlike ours, is specified in
terms of y, rather than Yt•That seems inappropriate theoretically and makes
it easier to generate autocorrelation functions relating to y.. that are close
to those present in the actual data.
Nevertheless, one simulation was conducted using a system composed of
equation (52) and column I of Table 2.With m1 and given by their
historical values, this system was simulated, starting with actual values for
1954.1, to generate time paths for Pt and y.From the artificial data
thusly obtained,it is possible to calculate implied autocorrelation
functions.The most interesting ones, given the three properties (i) (ii)
(iii) listed above, pertain to autocorrelations of Ap (inflation) with past
values of and of itself.The resulting patterns are shown in Figure 5.
From the latter it may be seen that the inflation rate's correlations with
yt-j have much the same general pattern as in Figure 2.except that the
28AC denotes the autocorrelation coefficients, at lags 1—40, of the inflation
rate Ap while CC denotes cross correlations of Apt withfor.3 •0—40.
29
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50magnitude peaks intheinitial quarter. Second. the inflation rate's
correlations withpastvalues of itself die out more slowly thaninFigure 2.
Ourestimatedsystem exhibits, then, even more inflation persistence than
that of F&M.
VI. Theoretical Issues
Before concluding, we need to briefly consider a few theoretical issues
concerning the specification of the P—bar model. The first of these pertains
to an apparent distinction between the Barro—Grossman (1976) and Mussa
(i981a, 1981b) versions of the P—bar variable——a distinction that is the
principal topic of a paper by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1984). Using to denote
the Barro-'Grossman concept, Obstfeld and Rogoff state that "The difference
between p anddeserves emphasis. p is the output price that would prevail
in a hypothetical Walrasian general equilibrium with fully flexible prices
Iwhereasl p is the output price that would clear the goods market given
current levels of the sticky—price system's endogenous variables" (1984. p.
164).By contrast, McCallum (1979, p.1; 1980, p. 733) evidently sees no
important difference in the two specifications. His reasoning is,
presumably, as follows.
In a typical application, the only feature of the model that keeps it
from being one of the Wairasian type, with fully flexible prices, is the
sticky—price adjustment mechanism under consideration. The system's
endogenous variables will differ from their Walrasian equilibrium values.
then, only to the extent that the prevailing price level Pt differs from Pt'
In a linear system, furthermore, the difference Zt — between the
prevailing arid Walrasian values of any variable z will be proportionate to Pt
—Pt'But Pt —Ptwill therefore be some linear combination of variables
each of which is proportional to Pt —Pt'5° Pt —twill itself be
proportionalto Pt —Pt'In this sense, then, there is no significant
30operational distinction between Pt and if the model being utilized is
linear.
The foregoing line of reasoning is consistent, it should be noted, with
the main result derived by Obstfeld and Rogoff (i984), who utilize a linear
system.Specifically, the Obstfeld—Rogoff theorem involving their equation
(13) asserts that the Barro—Grossman and Hussa schemes "yield structurally
equivalent.. .models"when the slope in the Barro—Grossman adjustment rule is
not too large (1984, p. i65).But, furthermore, when the Barro—Grossman
price adjustment mechanism is interpreted properly," that slope condition
always holds and the "apparent convergence problem disappears" (1984. p.
166).
The second theoretical issue to be considered pertains to the
specification of Pt Hussa (1981a, 198ib) and Obstfeld—Rogoff (1984) both
work In continuous—time settings, and the latter authors use35 a definition of
Pt that would, in our (a)(4) setup of Section II, imply that
(54) Pt—IBo+Pimt+fi2E_1(p,, — Pt)+BaYt-i + Vt — yti
rather than (9).Here the expectation of• Pt+i —Ptappears on the
right—hand side (rhs), instead of the expectation of Pt+i, and the rhs
denominator is correspondingly affected.The idea, evidently, is that the
inflation rate is a variable that is independent of the current price level.
But while the price level and the inflation rate are certainly conceptually
distinct, it is not clear that they should be treated as statistically
independent. The issue seems to be whether or not E_1(pt+1 —Pt)is
affected by shocks that affect Pt (In the present model, these shocks are
dated t—1 but that is beside the point.) And while there are models in which
E_1Pt.imovesintandem with they are rather special models.
Consequently,in the present paper (9) has been used rather than (54) in the
discussion of Section II.
3iIt may be useful, in this regard, to note that with definition (54) for
.andunder the special assumptions used to develop (16), we would have
(55) E_,AptMo + Thti + (9/Pi)ut_i
and inflation would be given as
(56) Apt =vi(yt-i—n-i)+ Mo + MiMti + $Ay-1 + (9/fit) ut_i.
The main point of interest, in a comparison between (56) and (17). is that
the coefficient attached to £flt_i may be considerably smaller in the latter.
depending onthe relative magnitudes of fi, andfi.Inparticular, E_1a
doesnot enter with a unitcoefficientwhen thePtdefinition of Section II
is utilized.
Athird issue concerns the fact that monetarypolicy is actually
implemented,in the U.S. and elsewhere, by manipulation of a short-term
interest rate such as rt in equations (5) and (6). rather than some monetary
aggregate such as rat. The question, then, is whether this fact makes
expressions such as (4), (7), (8), (9), and especially (12) inappropriate.
For the macroeconomic model discussed above can be thought of as including
(2fl4)(6)(9) and a policy rule for rt instead of (2)(4H5)(9) and a policy
rule for rat.But either way, the system determines values for Yt. Pt. Pt.
rt. and mt—-and it can be seen that the private sector behavioral equations
are equivalent in these two cases.Furthermore, derivation of the solution
equation (12) for Yt does not depend on the specification of the policy
process for rat in the analysis of Section II.Thus the only difference is
that it cannot be assumedthat at — E1mis independent of private sector
disturbanceswhenrt is the instrument; instead, mt will reflect
suchdisturbances as well as the unexpectedcomponentof the policy rule that
inthat case pertains to rt.
VI. Conclusions
In the foregoing sections we have explored the P—bar model ofprice
32level adjustment, which postulates that price changes occur so as to (I)
gradually eliminate discrepancies between actual and market—clearing values
and to (ii) reflect expected changes in market—clearing values themselves.
This model has implications that are more "classical" than most alternative
formulations that reflect gradual price adjustment; in particular,it
satisfies the natural rate hypothesis. With some informational structures it
will also satisfy the policy ineffectiveness proposition, but such a result
does not hold in general and can not be presumed.
Empirical implementation is hampered by the absence of any reliable
measure of the economy's market clearing or natural—rate value of output.
Also, accurate implementation requires accurate specification and estimation
of the economy's aggregate demand behavior. A set of results isdeveloped,
nevertheless, utilizing a proxy for market—clearing output that is a
log—linear function of a measure of fixed capital and the real price of oil.
The results are moderately encouraging but not entirely supportive. Two
highly positive aspects of the results are that they Ci) indicate a plausible
rate of price level adjustment in response to recent output levels and Cii)
imply an effect of expected money growth that is consistent with the model.
TheP—bar model's properties are compared with those of a specification
recently proposed by Fuhrer and Moore (i993a, i993b).The latter does not
satisfy the natural rate hypothesis but appears to perform very well
empirically. That last conclusion rests, however, on analysis that
questionably treats the market—clearing output rate as a deterministic trend.
33Appendix A
Net Private Nonresidential Fixed Capital
End of Quarter. $Billion, 1987 Prices
obs rat
1948 1027.525 1041.450 1055.409 1069.800
1949 1080.364 1090.339 1099.785 1109.000
1950 1119.414 1130.792 1143.118 1155.500
1951 1167.697 1180.266 1193.074 1205.700
1952 1217.019 1228.406 1238.883 1250.100
1953 1262.464 1274.845 1287.440 1300.000
1954 1310.636 1321.203 1331.917 1342.500
1955 1354.487 1367.195 1380.503 1394.300
1956 1409.297 1424.454 1439.762 1454.900
1957 1469.000 1483.012 1497.331 1511.300
1958 1520.001 1528.296 1536.376 1544.700
1959 1555.171 1565.983 1577.091 1588.200
1960 1600.552 1612.926 1625.017 1637.100
1961 1648.265 1659.552 1670.910 1682.600
1962 1696.094 1710.060 1724.198 1738.100
1963 1752.229 1766.809 1781.816 1797.200
1964 1815.692 1834.759 1854.381 1874.500
1965 1899.707 1926.018 1953.151 1981.400
1966 2011.370 2041.738 2072.313 2102.500
1967 2129.295 2156.068 2182.743 2209.899
1968 2237.624 2264.731 2292.065 2320.300
1969 2349.641 2379.193 2409.395 2439.300
1970 2465.560 2491.662 2518.021 2543.600
1971 2566.515 2589.510 2612.416 2635.500
1972 2659.722 2684.334 2709.280 2735.700
1973 2768.853 2803.335 2838.459 2873.900
1974 2906.255 2938.641 2970.159 3000.700
1975 3020.270 3039.298 3058.463 3077.800
1976 3096.010 3114.343 3133.058 .3152.100
1977 3176.085 3200.756 3225.997 3251.900
1978 3283.682 3317.720 3352.301 3387.500
1979 3425.806 3464.231 3503.586 3543.000
1980 3578.239 3611.281 3644.101 3677.400
1981 3709.902 3743.212 3777.146 3810.600
1982 3834.346 3857.018 3878.984 3900.600
1983 3917.057 3933.861 3951.392 3970.200
1984 4000.073 4031.486 4063.719 4096.800
1985 4134.108 4172.216 4209.434 4247.800
1986 4276.876 4305.318 4333.253 4361.500
1987 4384.419 4408.003 4432.533 4457.100
1988 4482.644 4509.134 4535.732 4561.899
1989 4585.375 4609.249 4633.490 4657.500
—4678.690 4699.626 4721.011 4742.399
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37Footnotes
tThese includeMcCallum(1979a,1980, 1982) and others. The 1980 j piece
includesa derivation/justification that is quite different from Hussa's. It
willbebriefly described below.
2The logic of Hussa's formulation has been sharply questioned by Rotemberg
(1982).
3The presence of inventory holdings would lead to a relaxation of this
assumption, which would become that demand is fully satisfied b production
or inventory draw—down. That modification would complicate the analysis
without altering its essential features. For a theoretical study that uses a
special version of the P—bar model with explicit recognition of inventories.
see Flood and Hodrick (1986).
4Adjustment costs are taken to depend on output relative to capacity, rather
than output alone, to reflect the presumption that such costs would not be
incurred in response to technological improvements that increase output
attainable with given quantities of labor.
5For an explicit algebraic treatment of this argument, see HcCallum (1980,
pp. 773-4).A useful special case obtains when between—priced charges are
not costly. Then y0and Pt n i.e., prices are set at levels that
are expected to be market—clearing. This case has been used by Flood (1981)
and HcCallujn (1989, Ch. 10).
6The unsatisfactory feature of thisspecification would not be eliminated,
moreover, by the addition of a stochastic disturbance term to the adjustment
equation.
considering a case that works against the conclusions being reached.
388Allan Meltzer has suggested thatnon—recognitionof inventory fluctuations
mightbesignificantly detrimental to the model's empirical performance.
That is certainly possible but there is no apparent reason why it should be
more relevant for this model of price adjustment than for any other.
9Actually, a slightly more restrictive case with b2 = — 0was used in my
previous papers.
101t would be theoretically appropriate to includea government spending
variablein (5), which would then also show up in (4).Thispossibility will
be investigated empirically in Section V.
It is also the case that additionalterms, such as at— Ptin (5) or its
lagged value in (6), might be expected to appear.But they would not have
major effects on the properties of the model.
12See the next paragraph.
t3This will be demonstratedmomentarily, in equations (Zi)—(29).
Thus we are implicitly omittingany "real—balance" term from the IS function
for simplicity. It will, however, be argued below in Section IV that such an
omission is theoretically inappropriate.
15The second property will not obtain,however, if monetary policy shocks
include both permanent and transitory components, which private agents are
unableto observe separately.This point was emphasized by Brunner,
Cukierman, and tleltzer(1983).
t6Here MACi) means first—order movingaverage.Note thattheimplied
assumptionis not that canbe expressed as the sum of two components, one
purely permanent (a random walk) and one purely transitory (white noise), for
this requires that 8<0.The reason for specifying 0)0 is the empirical
evidence to be discussed in Section V.
39t7Even in the simplest conceivable case, with jandVt== Ut = 0. we
findthat Ep+, —E—ip+ etflu(Mi($i +8a)—(i—7I($,+82)) $i(i+2fl/(Bi
+82)(Pt +p2(1—u1fl.
181t would not be negated by changes in the specification of aggregate demand
behavior or the stochastic properties of shocks.
'91n other words, the change in the inflation rate.The present point was
argued in )4cCallum (1982).
20The difference is that the MPS model uses a variable hereby denoted p in
place of ,withp given by a markup over unit production cost at "normal"
capacity levels. For more information, see McCallum (1979b).
21From here on, the tilde symbol will be used with this meaning, not the one
mentioned in the first paragraph of this section.
22Here I have simplified F&J4's specification by using two—period (rather than
four—period)contracts and by setting the weights on Xt andXt_tin(39a) at
0.5,rather thanestimating such weights empirically.
23Thatis, x — Pt a 0.5(0.5(x— Pt+x_—Pt-,) + 0.5(xt+i —Pt.i+ —
p)Iimplies0.5 (x — Pt) = 0.25 (xt_, — Pt-i) + 0.25 (xt.i — pt+i).
24The term "interest rates" will refer to nominal rates wiless the word "real"
is also included.
251n a Sidrauski—style model with explicit optimization on the part of
infinite—lived households, a household's choices in t depend upon its asset
holdings at the end of t-i.
26The F&H specification implies that thelong—term nominal rate R is related
to the short—term nominal rate by fl —(i+d)1rt +(1+dY'ER+1, where d
is a number such as 40.
40271t should perhaps be noted explicitly that theautocorrelation functions
emphasized by fl.M are conceptually quite different from VAR-based impulse
response functions, such as those featured by Cochrane (1994) and many
others.
28 may be the case that Taylor'sown version of his model provides a much
better match.In any event, this discussion should not be interpreted as
disrespective of Taylor's work, which has been extremely valuable.
290ne more item needs to be mentionedbefore continuing. That is the
empirical relationship between the short—term nominal rate of interest and
the long—term rate of interest that is the central topic in Fubrer and
Moore (1993b). What they find is that these two variables have moved
together quite closely over the 1965—1990 time period, a correlation that
they note is in theory dependent upon the manner in which policy is
conducted. The relationship reported is Pt= 0.006+O.23r.This is
evidently an OLS regression estimate.No standard error, DW, or
statistics are reported, but the plot of Pt and its fitted value suggest that
would be quite high and DW very low.
30Test results are consistent with thisbeing a cointegrating relationship.
31For observations since 1966, the nominalprice is obtained as the ratio of
nominal to real imports of petroleum products as reported in the National
Income and Product Accounts. For 1954—1966, the Producer Price Index (i.e..
WPI) series for crude petroleum was spliced on. Then quarterly averages of
monthly observations were calculated.The complete series was finally
divided by the GNP deflator (1982 —100). All series are seasonally
adjusted.
4132The basic idea, of course, is that with the United States being a net
importer of oil, total output (net of goods traded to obtain oil used as an
input) will be smaller the higher is the real price of oil.
OLS estimation will not provide consistent estimates of ,evenin
principle.
34At thetime of the conference, Jeff Fuhrer pointed out thatthe estimated
version (54) of the P—bar price adjustment equation does not satisfy the NW!.
That is true, as can be seen by setting Ay..i —0 and à a. 0in (54), but
only because the estimated equation (17) omits the term 82 (E_1 Pt+' —
Et_2pt)that Is part of the model.The reason for this omission is that
identification of the term seems almost hopeless, given the different
Information sets relevant to the two expectations. Thus the omission must be
judged a weakness of the paper's empirical work, but does not reflect any
discredit on the P—bar theory.
35See equation (12) of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1984).
361tis unclear to me which of these definitions Mussa intends to adopt.
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